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Article 2

How the Seizure of Counterfeit Goods Can Go Bad:
Waco International v. KHK Scaffolding, et. al.
Michael Coblenz*
INTRODUCTION
In 1984 Congress amended the Lanham Act to allow for the
1
seizure of counterfeit goods. This was part of a larger anti2
counterfeiting act that also created criminal penalties for
3
certain types of counterfeiting, and provided for treble damages
4
in cases of civil counterfeiting. This was needed, according to
the legislative history, to stem a growing business in piracy of
5
legitimate goods. Prior to that, it was possible, though seldom
successful, for trademark owners to seize goods under Rule 65 of
6
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Since then, practitioners
have taken the seizure remedy for granted in the fight against
7
counterfeiters.
Often forgotten, however, is that a seizure can be obtained

* Michael Coblenz is an associate in the intellectual property section of
Gardere Wynne Sewell, LLP in Houston, Texas. He received his J.D. from
Gonzaga University School of Law in 1994, and an LL.M. in Intellectual
Property Law from the University of Houston Law Center in 1998. He
participated in Waco International v. KHK Scaffolding, et. al. as an associate
with Royston Rayzor Vickery & Williams, LLP.
1. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (2000).
2. THE TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING ACT OF 1984, Pub.L.No. 98-473, 98
Stat.2178 (1984). This was part of the omnibus Crime Control Act of 1984.
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2001).
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2000).
5. See Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130
CONG. REC. 31673 (1984); S. REP. NO. 98-526, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3627. The Senate Report accompanied the original version of the bill that
added the criminal counterfeiting provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 2320. As originally
proposed, this bill included the ex parte seizure provision now found at 15
U.S.C. § 1116(d), within the criminal provision. The two provisions were
separated in the Joint Conference Committee.
6. See, e.g., In re Vuitton, et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1 (2nd Cir. 1979).
7. See, e.g., TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING 5-16 (George W. Abbott, Jr.,
and Lee S. Sporn, eds.) (1999 & Supp. 2000).
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improperly, and in that situation the wronged party can recover
8
for “wrongful seizure.” Even less well known is that punitive
damages are available “in instances where the seizure was
9
sought in bad faith.” Since the seizure statute was enacted
there has been a relative handful of reported wrongful seizure
10
cases.
In June, 2000, a jury in the Southern District of Texas, in
11
the case Waco International Inc., v. KHK Scaffolding et al.,
found a seizure to be both wrongful and in bad faith, and
awarded punitive damages against the party that improperly
obtained an ex parte seizure. This article will analyze that case
to elucidate some of the hidden dangers in the seizure statute as
a guide to others to avoid having a good seizure go bad.

8. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11) (2000) (providing in relevant part: “A person
who suffers damage by reason of a wrongful seizure . . . shall be entitled to
recover such relief as may be appropriate. . .”).
9. See id.
10. See Martin’s Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co.,
112 F.3d 1296 (5th Cir. 1997); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Accents, 955 F. Supp. 279
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Tee’s Ave., Inc., 924 F.
Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Jane Does # 1-2 and
John Does # 1-10, 876 F. Supp. 407 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Clorox Co. v. Inland
Empire Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1065 (C.D. Cal. 1994); Hsu
Terabyte Int’l, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 8 F.3d 27 (9th Cir. (Cal.) 1993); Elec. Lab.
Supply Co. v. Cullen, 977 F.2d 798 (3rd Cir. 1992); Major League Baseball
Promotion v. Colour-Tex, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 1035 (D.N.J. 1990); Gen. Elec. Co.
v. Speicher, 877 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1989); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Speicher, 676 F.
Supp. 1421 (N.D. Ind. 1988); and Skierkewiecz v. Gonzalez, 711 F. Supp. 931
(N.D. Ill. 1989).
11. See C.A. No. H-98-1309. On January 17, 2002, the Fifth Circuit
decided Waco Int’l Inc., v. KHK Scaffolding et al. See C.A. No. 00-20741. F.3d.
(5th Cir. 2002). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court in all regards, most
notably for this article finding that Waco's seizure was wrongful because it had
seized legitimate, non-infringing merchandise. See id. The Court also rejected
Waco's arguments that (1) the Judge's statement that the court had previously
held on Summary Judgment that the seizure was wrongful was an erroneous
"jury instruction," (2) that an experienced trademark attorney's expert
testimony of the normal procedures for obtaining an ex parte seizure was
impermissible testimony regarding the law, and (3) that KHK could not recover
attorney's fees because it had not been awarded "actual" damages. See id. The
Court, however, also rejected KHK's claim that the trial court erred in not
finding this an "exceptional case" and awarding all of KHK's attorney's fees.
See id.

2002]

SEIZURE OF COUNTERFEIT GOODS: WACO INT’L

61

I. THE LAW
A.

THE SEIZURE STATUTE

The eleven paragraphs of the seizure statute are a virtual
checklist of steps to follow to obtain a seizure of counterfeit
trademarked goods. Congress intentionally drafted it in this
manner to ensure “ample procedural protections for persons
12
against whom such orders are issued.” This section sets out
that checklist, with some elucidating commentary from the
legislative history.
1.

15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1): Counterfeits.

Seizures are only available in cases of where a counterfeit
mark is used.
In the case of a civil action arising under [15 U.S.C. §
1114(1)(a)] . . . with respect to a violation that consists of using a
counterfeit mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or
distribution of goods or services, the court may, upon ex parte
application, grant an order under subsection (a) of this section
pursuant to this subsection providing for the seizure of goods and
counterfeit marks involved in such violation and the means of
making such marks, and records documenting the manufacture,
13
sale, or receipt of things involved in such violation.

The statute defines “counterfeit mark” as:
a counterfeit of a mark that is registered on the principal register
in the United States Patent and Trademark Office for such goods
or services sold, offered for sale, or distributed and that is in use,
whether or not the person against whom relief is sought knew such
14
mark was so registered.

The Senate report to an early draft of the bill provides some
guidance as to the scope of seizures in this regard. “First,
because the bill addresses only the use of spurious marks that
are ‘identical to or substantially indistinguishable from’ a
registered mark, it does not reach routine business disputes

12. See Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130
CONG. REC. 31673 (1984), at 2080.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(B)(i).
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about arguable instances of trademark infringement.” The bill
also “does not include within its coverage so-called ‘gray market’
goods – i.e., authentic trademarked goods that have been
16
Finally, “the bill does not
obtained from overseas markets.”
extend to imitations of trade dress or packaging, unless those
features have been registered as trademarks on the principal
17
register in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.”
2.

15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(2): Notice to U.S. Attorney
The court shall not receive an application under this subsection
unless the applicant has given such notice of the application as is
reasonable under the circumstances to the United States attorney
for the judicial district in which such order is sought. Such
attorney may participate in the proceedings arising under such
application if such proceedings may affect evidence of an offense
against the United States. The court may deny such application if
the court determines that the public interest in a potential
18
prosecution so requires.

Many counterfeiting cases involve criminal activity and are
often investigated by law enforcement agencies. Therefore,
“under some circumstances, a privately obtained seizure order
19
might interfere with an ongoing criminal investigation.”
Because of this, Congress has required that a civil applicant
notify the U.S. Attorney before obtaining a seizure.
3.

15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(3): Application Requirements
The application for an order under this subsection shall (A) be based on an affidavit or the verified complaint
establishing facts sufficient to support the findings of fact and
conclusions of law required for such order; and
(B) contain the additional information required by paragraph
20
(5) of this subsection to be set forth in such order.

15. S. REP. NO. 98-526, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, at 3.
16. Id. See also Martin’s Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading
USA, Co., 112 F.3d 1296 (5th Cir. 1997); infra note 80 and accompanying text
(discussing gray market versus counterfeit goods).
17. S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 3.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(2).
19. S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 18.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(3).
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To obtain a seizure the applicant must supply the court with
both legal and factual information that supports the seizure.
This section sets forth the basic requirements, but with
reference to the two subsequent sections. Congress noted that
an application for seizure is “an ex parte proceeding” and “the
court will have no choice but to rely on the representations of
21
the applicant.”
4.

15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4): Additional Application
Requirements
The court shall not grant such an application unless (A) the person obtaining an order under this subsection
provides the security determined adequate by the court for the
payment of such damages as any person may be entitled to recover
as a result of a wrongful seizure or wrongful attempted seizure
22
under this subsection . . .

The first part of this section requires posting of a bond as
security “to ensure that the defendant will be made whole if the
23
seizure should prove to have been wrongful.”
Congress also
stated that the “provision of a bond is one of the critical
procedural protections designed to ensure that the defendant’s
rights are adequately protected during the course of an ex parte
24
Because of this, Congress recommended that in
seizure.”
“setting the amount of security, courts should err on the side of
caution – that is, towards larger bonds – in light of the need to
25
protect the unrepresented defendant.”
The court shall not grant such an application unless – . . .
(B) the court finds that it clearly appears from specific facts
that (i) an order other than an ex parte seizure order is not
adequate to achieve the purposes of [15 U.S.C. § 1114];
(ii) the applicant has not publicized the requested seizure;
(iii) the applicant is likely to succeed in showing that the
person against whom seizure would be ordered used a counterfeit
mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution

21. See Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130
CONG. REC. 31673 (1984), at 2080.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4).
23. See 130 CONG. REC. 31673, at 2080.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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of goods or services;
(iv) an immediate and irreparable injury will occur if such
seizure is not ordered;
(v) the matter to be seized will be located at the place
identified in the application;
(vi) the harm to the applicant of denying the application
outweighs the harm to the legitimate interests of the person
against whom seizure would be ordered of granting the application;
and
(vii) the person against whom seizure would be ordered, or
persons acting in concert with such person, would destroy, move,
hide, or otherwise make such matter inaccessible to the court, if
26
the applicant were to proceed on notice to such person.

The second part of this section requires that the court make
rather extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
court’s findings by necessity are dependent upon the information
supplied by the applicant. As the Senate Committee noted, the
court must find a sufficient basis for concluding, based upon sworn
statements submitted by the applicant, that: (1) there are
counterfeit goods or other listed materials at the place identified by
the applicant, and (2) the applicant will suffer immediate and
irreparable harm if the goods or materials are not seized through
27
an ex parte order.

The legislative history highlights subsection (vii), which
requires a showing that the defendant would not comply with
ordinary judicial procedures, as “the key to obtaining an ex parte
28
seizure order.” This subsection requires, “in essence, that the
applicant show that if he or she were to proceed on notice to the
defendant, the defendant or persons associated with the
defendant would destroy, transfer, or hide the materials in
question, or otherwise make them inaccessible to the court’s
29
Congress noted that this type of behavior is
jurisdiction.”
common among “fly-by-night” counterfeiters, but it “would not
be appropriate to order such a seizure against a reputable
30
merchant, absent unusual circumstances.” This is because a
“reputable businessperson would not be likely to conceal or
destroy evidence when notified of a pending lawsuit, and the

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(4).
S. REP. NO. 98-526, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, at 16.
130 CONG. REC. 31673, at 12081.
Id.
Id.
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issuance of an ex parte seizure order against such a person
31
would therefore be wholly inappropriate.”
5.

15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(5): Requirements of Seizure Order.
An order under this subsection shall set forth (A) the findings of fact and conclusions of law required for the
order;
(B) a particular description of the matter to be seized, and a
description of each place at which such matter is to be seized;
(C) the time period, which shall end not later than seven days
after the date on which such order is issued, during which the
seizure is to be made;
(D) the amount of security required to be provided under this
subsection; and
(E) a date for the hearing required under paragraph (10) of
32
this subsection.

This subsection sets forth the contents of the seizure order
issued by the court. One of the requirements, that the goods to
be seized and the location of the goods, be set out with some
particularity, is designed to meet the requirements of the Fourth
33
Amendment.
6.

15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(6): Limitation on Publicity.

“The court shall take appropriate action to protect the
person against whom an order under this subsection is directed
from publicity, by or at the behest of the plaintiff, about such
34
order and any seizure under such order.”
Congress noted that because “the unfairness of publicizing a
seizure order obtained without the defendant’s knowledge forms
the basis for limiting the plaintiff’s efforts to publicize the
seizure, the need for protection will primarily exist before and
35
during the seizure.” This subsection appears to be designed to
complement subsection 8, which requires the sealing of the
record until after the seizure hearing.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(5) (2000).
See infra notes and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(6).
130 CONG. REC. 31673, at 12082.
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15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(7): Disposition of the Seized Goods.
Any materials seized under this subsection shall be taken into
the custody of the court. The court shall enter an appropriate
protective order with respect to discovery by the applicant of any
records that have been seized. The protective order shall provide
for appropriate procedures to assure that confidential information
contained in such records is not improperly disclosed to the
36
applicant.

This subsection is also designed to protect the defendant.
Congress noted that the seizure of business “records poses
particularly difficult issues, since such documents may contain
sensitive business information. If any records have been seized,
therefore, the court should enter an appropriate protective order
37
with respect to discovery of the records.”
8.

15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(8): Sealing the Record.
An order under this subsection, together with the supporting
documents, shall be sealed until the person against whom the order is
directed has an opportunity to contest such order, except that any person
against whom such order is issued shall have access to such order and
38
supporting documents after the seizure has been carried out.

This subsection is a further effort to protect the defendant
should the seizure prove unwarranted. To this end, Congress
decided that the record should be sealed until “the defendant
39
has been given an opportunity to contest [the order].”
The
Senate Committee was “particularly concerned that the good
will of the defendants not be unfairly injured before they have
40
had their day in court.”
9.

15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(9): Service of Seizure by Law
Enforcement.
The court shall order that service of a copy of the order under
this subsection shall be made by a Federal law enforcement officer
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(7) (2000).
130 CONG. REC. 31673, at 12082.
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(8).
S. REP. NO. 98-526, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, at 16.
Id.
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(such as a United States marshal or an officer or agent of the
United States Customs Service, Secret Service, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, or Post Office) or may be made by a State or local
law enforcement officer, who, upon making service, shall carry out
the seizure under the order. The court shall issue orders, when
appropriate, to protect the defendant from undue damage from the
disclosure of trade secrets or other confidential information during
the course of the seizure, including, when appropriate, orders
restricting the access of the applicant (or any agent or employee of
41
the applicant) to such secrets or information.

This subsection is also included, in part, for the protection of
the defendant. The Senate Committee stated that “for the
maintenance of public order, it is important that law
enforcement officials, and not private citizens, enforce seizure
42
However, this subsection also requires the court to
orders.”
“issue appropriate orders to ensure that trade secrets or other
confidential data are not improperly disclosed during the course
43
of the seizure.”
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(10): Hearing.
(A) The court shall hold a hearing, unless waived by all the
parties, on the date set by the court in the order of seizure. That
date shall be not sooner than ten days after the order is issued and
not later than fifteen days after the order is issued, unless the
applicant for the order shows good cause for another date or unless
the party against whom such order is directed consents to another
date for such hearing. At such hearing the party obtaining the
order shall have the burden to prove that the facts supporting
findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary to support such
order are still in effect. If that party fails to meet that burden, the
seizure order shall be dissolved or modified appropriately.
(B) In connection with a hearing under this paragraph, the
court may make such orders modifying the time limits for discovery
under the Rules of Civil Procedure as may be necessary to prevent
44
the frustration of the purposes of such hearing.

Finally, Congress required that a hearing be held to

41. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(9).
42. S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 17.
43. Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130 CONG.
REC. 31673 (1984), at 12082.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(10) (2000).
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45

determine “the propriety of the seizure order.”

At the hearing, the plaintiff will have the burden of showing that
the seizure order was justified and that it continues to be
justifiable to hold the defendant’s goods or other materials. . . If the
plaintiff is unable to show that continuation of the seizure order is
justified, however, the seizure order should be dissolved or
46
modified appropriately.

11. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11): Wrongful Seizure.
A person who suffers damage by reason of a wrongful seizure
under this subsection has a cause of action against the applicant
for the order under which such seizure was made, and shall be
entitled to recover such relief as may be appropriate, including
damages for lost profits, cost of materials, loss of good will, and
punitive damages in instances where the seizure was sought in bad
faith, and, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances, to
recover a reasonable attorney’s fee. The court in its discretion may
award prejudgment interest on relief recovered under this
paragraph, at an annual interest rate established under section
6621 of title 26, commencing on the date of service of the claimant’s
pleading setting forth the claim under this paragraph and ending
on the date such recovery is granted, or for such shorter time as
47
the court deems appropriate.

If it turns out that the seizure was not justified, the
defendant may bring a claim against the applicant to recover
any damages as a result of the seizure. Congress specifically
stated that, “a person who is subject to a wrongful ex parte
seizure should be fully compensated by the party who obtained
48
the seizure order.”
In the years since the seizure statute was enacted, seizures
have become a relatively commonplace tool in the fight against
counterfeiters. While common, they are not routine. As one
practitioner’s guide explained: “It would be a fundamental and
possibly fatal mistake for counsel or mark owners to treat such
applications as anything other than incredibly extraordinary
49
The legislative history for the seizure statute
proceedings.”

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

130 CONG. REC. 31673, at 12082.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(11) (2000).
130 CONG. REC. 31673, at 12080.
TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING, supra note 7, at 5-16.
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supports this contention, stating that a seizure is considered to
50
be an “extraordinary remedy.” Courts agree: “Ex parte seizures
are dangerous weapons, which, if not carried out with utmost
care and restraint, create a potential for great abuse. They
must be extremely limited in scope and seizures which go
beyond such limits must be deemed wrongful, entitling
51
defendant to relief under section 1116(d)(11).”
The legislative history provides some limited guidance as to the
confines of an ex parte seizure. The term wrongful seizure “was
intentionally left undefined . . . in the belief that the courts will best
be able to interpret this phrase under the circumstances of each
individual case, and in light of precedents under Rule 65 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Congress does, however, set
out a few “rules of thumb” for determining whether a seizure
might be wrongful:
The first is that the mere fact that a few legitimate items may
have been seized does not make the seizure as a whole
wrongful. . . . The second is that the seizure will be considered
wrongful if the applicant acted in bad faith in seeking it. For
example, it would obviously constitute bad faith for an applicant to
seek a seizure order in an effort to prevent the sale of legitimate
merchandise at discount prices. Similarly, it would constitute bad
faith for an applicant deliberately to defy a court order limiting its
access to confidential documents seized from the defendant. Third,
a seizure must be considered ‘wrongful’ if the matter seized is
legitimate, noninfringing merchandise. In such a case, even if the
plaintiff acted in good faith, the defendant should be compensated
for his or her losses caused by the plaintiff’s use of an ex parte
52
process.

The Senate report, which preceded the Joint Committee report,
adds some details to the proposal behind the wrongful seizure
provision, and fleshes out some requirements for a bad faith
seizure:
The Committee wishes to discourage frivolous of [sic] nuisance
suits under the bill, and to help prevent an allegation or [sic]
counterfeiting from becoming a “boiler plate” pleading in every
trademark suit. Should a party bring a suit in bad faith under this
bill – for example, as part of an effort to control the resale prices of

50. 130 CONG. REC. 31673, at 12082.
51. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Speicher, 676 F. Supp. 1421, 1436 (N.D. Ind. 1988).
52. 130 CONG. REC. H12083 (comprising the only mention of “bad faith” in
the legislative history of this statute).
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authentic trademarked goods – this subsection provides that the
victimized defendant will be entitled to an award of damages,
including punitive damages when appropriate, and the costs of
defending the action, including reasonable attorney’s and
investigator’s fees. The Committee believes that if a defendant can
show that the plaintiff pleaded or pursued a suit against him or
her in bad faith, an award of substantial punitive damages will
usually be appropriate. . . . [A] plaintiff need not have conclusive
proof that the defendant has intentionally trafficked in known
counterfeits in order to file a suit under this bill. Should a plaintiff
plead or pursue a suit when it is clear that the suit is baseless,
however, this provision would make the plaintiff liable in damages
to the victimized defendant. For example, should the plaintiff
learn as a result of discovery that any claim of counterfeiting is
53
meritless, continued pursuit of such a claim would be in bad faith.

B. SEIZURE CASES
Since the statute was enacted there have been about a dozen
seizure cases, but only a handful involving a counterclaim for
wrongful seizure. Most were unsuccessful, and none was found a
seizure to be in bad faith. However, these cases do provide some
additional guidance regarding the proper way to obtain a seizure.

1.

Basic Seizure Cases.

At least three cases have upheld the seizure of clearly
54
counterfeit goods but none of them analyzed the seizure statute
in any detail. In one case, the court noted that the applicant
had fully investigated the counterfeiter, and fully supported its
55
seizure application with believable evidence. In a second case,
the court upheld the seizure on a 12(b)(6) motion, and noted
that a counterclaim under Section 1116 (d)(11) would be a more
appropriate remedy for allegation that the seizure was
56
One court, the district court of Puerto Rico, went
wrongful.
53. S. REP. NO. 98-526, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, at 19.
54. See Sega Enters., Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(seizure of counterfeit computer programs); see also Tommy Hilfiger Licensing,
Inc. v. Tee’s Ave., Inc., 924 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (seizure of counterfeit
Hilfiger clothing); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Accents, 955 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(seizure of counterfeit Gucci handbags).
55. See Gucci Am., 955 F. Supp. 279, at 955.
56. See Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 17.

2002]

SEIZURE OF COUNTERFEIT GOODS: WACO INT’L

71

beyond the literal scope of the seizure statute, and allowed the
seizure of T-shirts that probably were not technically
57
counterfeit.
In upholding the seizure of counterfeits, the Third Circuit
noted that Congress considered ‘ex parte seizures a necessary
tool to thwart the bad faith efforts of fly by night defendants to
evade the jurisdiction of the court,’ and intended seizure orders
to be available whenever a temporary restraining order and the
threat of contempt for a violation thereof are unlikely to result
in preservation of the evidence and the removal of the
58
counterfeit merchandise from commerce.
At least one court held that the seizure of business records
59
is not wrongful. The court allowed the seizure of counterfeit
Reebok athletic shoes, froze the defendant’s assets, and allowed
the seizure of defendant’s business records. The court noted
that this was within the equitable powers of the court, and,
without detailed analysis, found that “the Seizure Order was
properly granted in accordance with the Trademark
60
Counterfeiting Act of 1984.”
A number of courts have addressed the Fourth Amendment
issues raised by the seizure statute, and have found that a
properly conducted seizure satisfies the Constitutional
61
requirements. In two cases, the seizures were upheld. In at
least two cases, the courts denied the seizures based on Fourth
Amendment concerns. In the first, Sports Design and Dev., Inc.,
v. Schonebaum, the court denied the seizure because the
location of the allegedly offending goods was not adequately
63
described.62 In the second case, Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Doe,

57. See Pepe (U.K.) Ltd. v. Ocean View Factory Outlet Corp., 770 F. Supp.
754 (D. Puerto Rico 1991) (discussed in more detail under section on
counterfeiting, infra and accompanying text).
58. See Vuitton v. White, 945 F.2d 569, 575 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting 130
CONG. REC. H120781).
59. See Reebok Int’l, Ltd, v. Marnatech Enter., Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1521
(S.D. Cal. 1989).
60. Id. at 1525 (citing to 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (d)(1)(A) (1988).
61. See Reebok Int’l, Ltd. v. Su Youn Pak, 683 F. Supp. 929, 930 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (The court noted briefly that the application for seizure provided
sufficient facts to support the application and met the requirements of the
seizure statute and Fourth Amendment.); see also General Motors Corp. v.
Gibson Chemical & Oil Corp., 786 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1986).
62. 871 F. Supp. 1158, 1166 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (noting that the plaintiff’s

investigation never determined that counterfeit goods were in the defendant’s
home, and therefore, seizure should be denied).
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the court determined that a seizure application did not meet the
specificity requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
The
plaintiff sought the seizure of T-shirts bearing counterfeit
depictions of Looney Tunes characters (Bugs Bunny, Daffy
Duck, etc.) from unknown defendants presumed to be operating
from a building in Brooklyn, New York. The court set out the
provisions of the statute, and noted the requirement specifying
the location of the goods to be seized:
With respect to requirement that the application identify the
place where the matter to be seized may be found, Congress
acknowledged that courts will have to be flexible – “but should
require as great a degree of specificity as is possible under the
circumstances, and should not grant orders, for example,
permitting seizure to take place ‘anywhere in downtown
64
Washington, DC.”

The court then noted that the broad seizure application
requested by the plaintiff would not satisfy the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, and quoted from the
Supreme Court to explain the purpose of the particularity
requirement:
The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement was to
prevent general searches. By limiting the authorization to search
to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to
search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully
tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of
the side-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to
prohibit. Thus, the scope of a lawful search is “defined by the
object of the search and the place in which there is a probably
65
cause to believe that it may be found.”

The plaintiff’s seizure application asked to seize the inventory of
the defendants (whose identity was unknown) at any location in
New York. The court determined that this was grossly over66
broad.

63. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Jane Does # 1-2 and John Does # 1-10,
876 F. Supp. 407, 407 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
64. Id. at 411 (quoting 130 CONG. REC. H12076 (1984)).
65. Id. at 413 (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)).
66. See Time Warner Entm’t Co., 876 F. Supp. 407, at 413.
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Wrongful Seizure Cases

A finding of wrongful seizure most frequently occurs when
the goods seized were not in fact counterfeits. For example, in
Clorox Co. v. Inland Empire Wholesale Grocers, Inc., the
defendant was accused of placing counterfeit “Pine-Sol”® labels
on generic pine cleaners.67 In fact, the defendant produced
generic cleaners that it occasionally shipped without labels for
purchasers who would attach their own labels. The defendant
counter-sued for wrongful seizure, and the plaintiff sought to
dismiss the counterclaim. The court noted that the goods were
not counterfeits, and refused to dismiss the counterclaim. An ex
parte seizure order has been called a “drastic” remedy which
should be ordered only as a last resort. There are statutory
safeguards present in 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (d)(4), (7), and (11). A
seizure is wrongful:
if the applicant acted in bad faith in seeking it. For example, it
would obviously constitute bad faith for an applicant to seek a
seizure order in an effort to prevent the sale of legitimate
merchandise at discount prices. . . [A] seizure must be considered
“wrongful” if the matter seized is legitimate, noninfringing
68
merchandise.

In a second case, the trial court initially determined that
the goods were not counterfeits because they did not bear
counterfeit marks, even though they were placed in a box with
69
the counterfeit marks. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
70
reversed, determining that the goods were counterfeits.
Finally, in a third case, a court determined that it would be
wrongful to seize non-counterfeit goods, but without an actual
71
In that
seizure there can be no claim for wrongful seizure.
case, the defendant – who had been contracted by an authorized
distributor to make “Budweiser” T-shirts – voluntarily turned
over the shirts. The defendant argued that even though there
67. See Clorox Co. v. Inland Empire Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1065,

1065 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
68. Id. at 1071 (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Speicher, 681 F. Supp. at 1342,
and quoting Major League Baseball Promotions v. Colour-Tex, 729 F. Supp.
1035, 1048 (D.N.J. 1990).
69. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Speicher, 676 F.Supp 1421 (N.D. Ind. 1988), upheld
on reh’g, 681 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ind, 1988).
70. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Speicher, 877 F.2d 531, 531 (7th Cir. 1989); see
also infra Part IV.A.
71. See Major League Baseball Promotion Corp. v. Colour-Tex, Inc., 729 F.
Supp. 1035 (D.N.J. 1990).
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was no actual seizure, invalid application made the seizure
wrongful.
The court disagreed, and determined that the
wrongful seizure statute applied only in cases of actual
72
seizures.
In a second line of wrongful seizure cases, aggrieved
defendants sought to bring a wrongful seizure action against the
attorney who obtained the seizure as well as the plaintiff
represented by that attorney. In one early seizure case, a
Federal court in Illinois determined that the attorney for the
73
applicant could be sued for wrongful seizure. The court noted
numerous errors in the seizure application, and allowed the
party whose goods had been seized to sue the plaintiff’s
attorneys for wrongful seizure, abuse of process, trespass to
land, and trespass to chattel.
This holding was directly
contradicted by the Third Circuit in Elec. Lab Supply Co. v.
74
The plaintiff (“ELSCO”) was in the business of
Cullen.
disposing of electronic parts and retrieving the valuable portions
for companies like Motorola. When Motorola found that Hong
Kong companies were selling electronic equipment that
contained Motorola semiconductors, they suspected ELSCO
might be involved, but an investigation determined that this
was highly unlikely. Despite its own investigation, Motorola
obtained an ex parte seizure order under 15 U.S.C. §1116 (d), but
was unable to find any evidence that ELSCO was selling its
semiconductors. ELSCO countersued for wrongful seizure, and
Motorola settled. ELSCO then sued the attorneys that had
obtained the seizure order, claiming they had withheld
information, and misled the court in the seizure application.
The court went through the seizure statute point by point, but
determined that the term “applicant” in the seizure statute does
75
not include the applicant’s attorneys.
Finally, it should be noted that in at least one case, the
victim of a wrongful seizure successfully brought sanctions
against the attorneys who wrongfully brought the seizures,
though the sanctions were later vacated. In Super Power
Supply, Inc. v. Macase Indus. Corp., the court initially awarded
sanctions against the seizure applicant’s attorney because of
numerous misstatements he made in the seizure application and

72.
73.
74.
75.

See id. at 1051 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (d)(11)).
See Skierkewiecz v. Gonzalez, 711 F. Supp. 931, 931 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
See Elec. Lab. Supply Co. v. Cullen, 977 F.2d 798, 798 (3d Cir. 1992).
See id. at 808.
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at subsequent hearings.76 The court noted that it in ex parte
proceedings it must rely on the applicant to be truthful. “Where
such extraordinary relief as an unnoticed, ex parte seizure order
is sought, the court necessarily relies upon the diligence,
honesty, and forthrightness of the represented party’s counsel to
ensure that the rights of the unrepresented party are not unduly
77
infringed.” The court then imposed sanctions on the applicant’s
attorney because he should have known there was no basis for
the ex parte seizure, he misrepresented facts to the court, and
78
did not correct these errors once he became aware of them.
3.

Bad Faith Wrongful Seizure

Finally, there is at least one case that deals with the issue
of whether a seizure was sought or obtained in bad faith such
that it would warrant punitive damages. This issue was
addressed by the Fifth Circuit twice in Martin’s Herend Imports,
79
Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co. Martin’s Herend
80
was the exclusive importer for Herendi porcelain. Diamond &
Gem sold Herendi porcelain that the proprietor had purchased
81
in Hungary and the United States.
Martin’s Herend sued
Diamond & Gem for trademark infringement and trademark
counterfeiting, and sought an obtained an ex parte seizure order,
82
seizing Diamond & Gem’s stock of Herendi porcelain. At trial,
the court granted Martin’s Herend’s motion for summary
judgment for trademark infringement, and dismissed Diamond
83
& Gem’s counterclaim for wrongful seizure.
In Martin’s Herend I, the Fifth Circuit held that the district
court erred in dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim for
wrongful seizure. “Given the draconian nature of this ex parte
76. 154 F.R.D. 249 (C.D. Cal. 1994) vacated in part, 1995 US Dist Lexis
22276 (C.D. Cal. Jan 31, 1995).
77. Id. at 256.
78. See id.
79. See Martin’s Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co.,
112 F.3d 1296, 1296 (5th Cir. 1997) (aff’d in part after remand, 195 F.3d 765
(5th Cir. 1999). Only the first iteration of Martin’s Herend (Martin’s Herend I)
was available when Waco filed suit. The second case (Martin’s Herend II) was
decided just before the original trial date of the Waco case.
80. See id, at 1299.
81. Herendi manufactures high quality tableware and figurines in
Hungary. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 1300.

76

MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW

[Vol. 3:59

remedy, providing for the seizure of defendant’s wares and
records without prior notice . . . we believe that it should be
84
narrowly construed.”
The court remanded, noting that the
statute specifically excludes gray market goods like the
defendant’s; therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the
85
defendant’s counterclaims.
86
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Martin’s Herend II, was
decided after Waco had filed suit, but provided guidance directly
on the issue of a bad faith wrongful seizure. Martin’s Herend –
the exclusive U.S. distributor of Hungarian Herendi porcelain –
obtained an ex parte seizure of “gray market” Herendi porcelain
distributed by Diamond & Gem. Diamond & Gem asserted at
trial on remand “that the standard for bad faith is an objective
one that can be evinced by ‘anticompetitive motive’ coupled with
87
The Fifth Circuit
‘knowing lack of need for a seizure.’”
affirmed the legal standard applied by the trial court, “namely,
88
whether Martin’s sought the seizure knowing it was baseless.”
The appellate court also noted that a good faith belief that an
operation is selling counterfeit goods need not even be true: “‘[A]
plaintiff need not have conclusive proof that the defendant has
intentionally trafficked in known counterfeits in order to file
suit.’ S.REP. NO. 98-526, at 19, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3645.
Accordingly, the [district] court used the right standard for
89
finding bad faith.”
This was the general state of counterfeiting and seizure law
that existed in June 1998, before Waco Scaffolding went to court
and obtained a seizure order. A simple reading of the statute
provides a road map of how to conduct a seizure; the legislative
history provides some insight as to the outside boundaries of an
acceptable seizure, and the case law adds real world examples.
The law in this regard is fairly clear. So what happened with

84. See id. at 1306.
85. See id.
86. 195 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 1999). The party bringing the claim of wrongful
seizure has the burden of proof to show that the seizure was wrongful and, if
applicable, obtained in bad faith. See id. Diamond & Gem had argued that
because the applicant had the burden in obtaining the seizure, they retained
the burden of showing that the seizure was not wrongful. See id. The Court of
Appeals rejected this argument. See id.
87. 195 F.3d at 773.
88. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 98-526, at 19). “Should a plaintiff plead or
pursue a suit when it is clear that the suit is baseless, however, this provision
would make the plaintiff liable in damages to the victimized defendant.” Id.
89. 195 F.3d at 773.
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Waco seizure? What did Waco do to engage in a “bad faith
wrongful seizure”? A brief discussion of the facts, both operative
and merely interesting, sets the stage.
III. BACKGROUND
Both the plaintiff, Waco Scaffolding, and the defendant,
KHK Scaffolding, manufacture and sell scaffolding. Waco has
been making scaffolding in the United States since the late
90
91
1940’s. Its main product line is “frame scaffolding,” although
92
it also sells some “system scaffolding.” The colors red and blue
93
are Waco’s primary choice for its frame scaffolding.
KHK has been making and selling scaffolding in Europe and
94
the Middle East since the late 1970s. In the mid 1990s KHK
began selling system scaffolding in the United States from an
office in Houston, Texas. In 1997, KHK expanded its line of
95
KHK sold frame
scaffolding to include frame scaffolding.
scaffolding in red and blue, which are common colors in the
96
scaffolding industry.
As is undoubtedly appreciated by anyone who has ever seen
90. The name Waco is an acronym for the name of the original company,
the Wilson-Albrecht Company. Background information on Waco Scaffolding
was obtained from Waco’s web site at <http://www.wacoscaf.com>.
91. Frame scaffolding consists of a two rectangular end frames attached by
two cross braces to form a frame box. Planks are then placed on the top of the
frames to create a work platform. These are the most commonly seen
scaffolding on the sides of buildings. See Waco Int'l, Inc. v. KHK Scaffolding, et
al., C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Plaintiff Trial Exhibit 23, “Waco’s Guide to
Scaffolding”).
92. System scaffolding consists of bars and connectors, similar to an
®
Erector Set , that allows the creation of irregular shaped scaffolding
structures. Id.
93. Paint color was a major point of contention in the case, and the
evidence revealed that most major scaffolding companies sell their product in
certain colors. For example, Vanguard is generally blue, Safway is generally
gray, and Waco is generally red. However, it has been standard practice in the
industry for many years to paint scaffolding to match a customers existing
stock, so there can be no trademark rights in the colors.
94. Information regarding the history of the two companies was not
presented at trial.
95. Waco Int’l, Inc., C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Defendant’s Answer and
Counterclaims, ¶ 26).
96. Evidence at trial proved that many other manufactures use red and
blue as primary colors, and most manufacturers will paint to match a
customers existing stock of frame scaffolding. See, e.g., Waco Int’l, Inc., C.A.
No. H-98-1309, (Testimony of Frank Shemek, Trial Transcript, 835 – 837 (June
20, 2000)).
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scaffolding, there are only a handful of possible configurations
for frame scaffolding.
Most of these configurations were
97
developed by scaffolding companies well over twenty years ago.
Most scaffolding companies now make frames in these
configurations, and it is common to refer to these configurations
by the name of the first company to develop them. So, for
example, there is a Safway style frame, a Vanguard style frame,
and a Waco style frame. Most companies accept this fact, but
Waco has attempted for years to stop people in the industry
from using the term “Waco style” scaffolding.
When KHK entered the frame scaffolding market, it sent
out introduction letters and brochures for its products stating
that it sells most major styles, and that its frames are
compatible with “Safway, Vanguard, and Waco” style frames.
Thousands of these letters were sent out in late 1997 and early
1998. Letters were sent to most scaffolding manufacturers,
sellers, renters, and users throughout the United States.
Letters and brochures were even sent to Waco and its many
distributors. In early 1998, when KHK began to actually sell
frame scaffolding, its salesmen (either by error or force of habit
based on common industry practice) sent out a handful of
98
99
solicitation and quotation letters, and a number of invoices,
that referred to KHK’s product as “WACO” scaffolding.
A Waco distributor in Ohio received a quotation stating:
100
“here is a quote for your Waco Red Scaffolding.”
The
distributor forwarded the letter to Waco, who in turn notified its
attorney in Houston, Texas. Concerned that KHK might be
attempting to pass off KHK goods as genuine Waco scaffolding,
Waco’s Houston attorney sent KHK a “cease and desist” letter.
When KHK received the letter, its manager distributed a memo
to company salesmen explaining proper sales terminology, and
instructing employees to tell customers that they sold
scaffolding compatible with major manufacturers, including
Waco. Unfortunately, KHK did not otherwise respond to the
letter to either Waco or its attorneys until nearly a month later
97. And, therefore, any patent on the configuration has long expired. The
configurations are in the public domain, and any company can copy the
configuration.
98. Waco submitted approximately six into evidence at trial.
99. Approximately thirty were submitted into evidence at trial.
100. The KHK salesman who made the quote testified in his deposition that
he only quoted what the customer asked for, so in this case he claims the
customer asked for a quote on “Waco Red and Blue” scaffolding. The
distributor disputed this at trial.
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because the president of the company was traveling in the
Middle East on business.
In the interim, and concerned by the lack of response to the
cease and desist letter, Waco’s attorneys hired an investigator to
go to KHK and buy some of the frame scaffolding. The
investigator was given a list of frames that were described as
101
“Waco compatible” in the KHK sales brochure.
The
investigator’s report stated that he was taken through the
facility by a salesman who explained that KHK did not currently
stock the “WB” (or “Waco blue” style frame), but they did have
the “WR” (“Waco red” style) frame. The investigator stated that
the KHK salesman never use the term “Waco” during his visit.
After showing the investigator the red frame scaffolding, the
salesman filled out an order sheet that listed the frames by part
number. He gave this sheet to a shipping clerk who filled out a
shipping report form for the warehouse to bring the proper
frames to the loading dock for the investigator to pick up. This
shipping report referred to the frames as “Waco 5’ x 6’7” frames.”
The investigator picked up the frames and shipped them the
Waco’s headquarters in Cleveland, Ohio. Later that day the
KHK salesman realized that the investigator had not received
an invoice for the goods, so mailed him a copy. The invoice
referred to the scaffolding frames by the part number and did
not mention “Waco” at all.
This information was turned over the Waco’s local counsel
in Houston. The attorney stated that it was her impression from
these documents and the investigator’s report, that KHK was
selling counterfeit “Waco” scaffolding. She also inferred from
the variance between the shipping report and the invoice that
KHK was either trying to hide their activities, or actively
altering documents. Based on this interpretation, Waco applied
for an ex parte seizure order. Waco asserted that KHK’s goods
were “counterfeit” because the Waco terminology had been used
102
Waco
“in connection with” the sale of the KHK scaffolding.
obtained the seizure order on April 30, 1998, and carried out the
seizure on May 5, 1998.

101. The investigator was directed to purchase scaffolding by the item
number listed in the KHK brochure for the compatible product.
102. See Waco Int’l, Inc., C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Plaintiff’s Original Verified
Complaint, ¶ 42).
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IV. ANALYSIS
As set forth above, the state of the law was fairly clear, as
were the facts available to Waco when it filed the application for
a seizure. The application set in motion a chain of events that
ultimately led to a jury determining that Waco’s seizure was
wrongful, and conducted in bad faith.
How did that happen? What did Waco do that turned its
case against an alleged “counterfeiter” onto its head, resulting in
an award against Waco? The answer and the analysis will start
103
with Waco’s erroneous definition of counterfeiting.
For the
sake of clarity and logic, the analysis of Waco’s actions, and how
they were found to be in bad faith, will follow the basic
requirements of the seizure statute. It is important to note that
Waco did not improperly follow every step in the seizure
checklist, and therefore, not every statutory section will be
addressed. However, each of the errors will be described in the
order they arise within the statute.
A.

COUNTERFEITING

The first paragraph of the seizure statute states that
seizure is only available in cases “that consist[] of using a
104
counterfeit mark.”
Waco admitted that KHK never placed a
spurious mark on its products.
It was known from the
beginning of the case that Waco’s investigator did not purchase
KHK scaffolding with a Waco trademark on them. Waco’s
central allegation in obtaining the seizure was the KHK was
selling “counterfeit” scaffolding. This contention was based on
105
on
the fact that KHK had used the “Waco” terminology
invoices “in connection with the sale” of KHK’s compatible
scaffolding painted in red. The evidence at trial showed that
KHK, and any other scaffolding producer, was free to sell

103. Waco was consistent throughout the two years of litigation in its
insistence that KHK’s use of Waco terminology on handwritten sales
documents constituted counterfeiting. See Waco International, Inc., C.A. No.
H-98-1309, (Plaintiff’s Original Verified Complaint, ¶ 42; Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration of Order, For Modification of Judgment, and Alternatively for
Partial New Trial, p. 4).
104. 15 U.S.C. §1116(d)(1)(A) (2000).
105. Waco never claimed that KHK used a likeness of its mark. Waco’s
contention dealt with the word marks “WACO” and “HI LOAD” that a KHK
salesman wrote by hand on a shipping document.
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106

compatible scaffolding in red.
The jury also determined that
KHK’s use of the “Waco” terminology was fair use to describe
the compatibility of KHK’s scaffolding frames.
Is it possible, however, that KHK’s use of the “Waco”
terminology on documentation in connection with the sale of
scaffolding could be counterfeiting? Probably not. Waco’s
contention relies on a narrow, and ultimately erroneous, reading
of the seizure statute, which authorizes a seizure “with respect
to a violation that consists of using a counterfeit mark in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of
107
Waco’s narrow reading of the statute defies
goods. . . .”
common sense, the case law, and statutory construction.
The seizure statute defines a counterfeit mark as a
counterfeit of a mark that is registered on the principal register in
the United States Patent and Trademark Office for such goods or
services sold, offered for sale, or distributed and that is in use,
whether or not the person against whom relief is sought knew such
108
mark was so registered.

This is in addition to the definition provided by the Lanham Act,
which defines a “counterfeit mark [as] a spurious mark which is
identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a
109
registered mark.”
The seizure statute applies in civil actions “arising under
section 32(1)(a) of this title . . . with respect to a violation that
110
consists of using a counterfeit mark.” Such civil actions are,
therefore, entirely dependant upon the statutory definitions of
Section 1114, which provides the remedies for trademark
infringement. Section 1114(1) states in pertinent part that any
person who shall, without the consent of the registrant –
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause

106. Waco’s President and Vice President admitted at trial that the Waco
scaffolding configuration was in the public domain, and anyone could produce
and sell it. They also stated that they could not stop anyone from selling red
scaffolding. Their only objection was to the description of this look-a-like
product as “Waco” style scaffolding. The jury ultimately determined that this
description was fair use.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(A) (2000).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1)(B).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
110. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (1)(A).
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mistake, or to deceive. . .shall be liable for trademark infringement.

The definition section of the Lanham act also provides that
for
purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in
commerce
(1) on goods when —
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their
containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or
labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such
placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the
112
goods or their sale.

The Act further provides that a counterfeit mark is one that
when placed in any manner on the goods makes it “identical
with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered
113
mark.”
Use of a mark in association with goods only applies
where “the nature of the goods makes such placement
114
impracticable.”
This definition is supported by virtually all
reported cases involving counterfeits or allegations of
counterfeiting. One district court stated that a “counterfeit
trademark is a falsely applied mark, identical to or substantially
115
indistinguishable
from
the
registered
trademark.”
Unfortunately, the district court did not explain the reasoning
behind this statement, although it is supported by the statutory
construction set out above.
Many other cases dealing with spurious marks affixed to
look-a-like goods did not explicitly define the term, but applied
116
Because these cases deal with clearthe definition implicitly.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (emphasis added).
113. Id.
114. Id. While the Court did not dissect the definition of counterfeiting in
this manner, it ruled at both the Preliminary Injunction and Summary
Judgment that KHK did not sell “counterfeit” goods and did not engage in
“counterfeiting.” See id.
115. Reebok Int’l. Ltd. v. K-Mart Corp., 849 F. Supp. 252, 273 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 427; Montroes Rolex, S.A. v. Snyder, 718 F.2d 524,
532 (2d Cir. 1982)), vacated as moot 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1864 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(settlement by parties renders previous ruling moot).
116. See Rolex Watch USA v. Meece, 158 F.3d 816 (5th Cir. 1998)
(refurbished Rolex watches with non-genuine parts); Martin’s Herend Imps.,
Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading USA, Co., 112 F.3d 1296 (5th Cir. 1997)
(imported gray market Herendi porcelain which was identical to the original
article); Levi Strauss & Co. v. Shilon, 121 F.3d 1309 (9th Cir. 1997) (look-a-like
Levi jeans and counterfeit Levi tags and labels); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Gen. Circuit Breaker & Elec. Supply, Inc., 106 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 1997)
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cut examples of counterfeiting, they do not explicitly address the
issue of whether a counterfeit mark must be placed on the goods.
It is worth noting that not a single reported counterfeiting case
supports the idea that use of a mark on invoices can be
considered counterfeiting.
Waco relied upon three cases to support its contention of the
extension of the definition of counterfeiting. First, Waco relied
on the Speicher trilogy of cases involving “knock-off” General
117
Electric carbon-alloy cutting inserts.
The defendant in that
case made copies of GE “carboloy 570” cutting inserts, which
were put into authentic GE boxes marked as GE carboloy “570”
118
In the first opinion, the Court determined that
cutting insert.
the knock-off cutting tools were not counterfeit because
“Speicher did not copy the G.E. or Carboloy marks,” but rather
“Speicher used actual G.E. boxes which carried the authentic
119
G.E. trademarks.” Because the goods were not counterfeit, the
court found the resulting ex parte seizure to be wrongful and
awarded damages to Speicher. In the second opinion, the court
denied G.E.’s request for reconsideration. The court noted that
G.E.’s seizure application requested the seizure of “all cutting
inserts marked with the number ‘570’” and “all cutting inserts
bearing reproductions of any of General Electric’s trademarks,”
120
but no such cutting inserts were found or seized.
(refurbished Westinghouse circuit breakers sold with the original
Westinghouse mark still attached); Intel Corp. v. Terebyte Int’l, Inc., 6 F.3d
614 (9th Cir. 1993) (math coprocessor computer chips that had been relabeled
to indicate that they were faster than they actually were); Vuitton v. White,
945 F.2d 569 (3d Cir. 1991) (fake Louis Vuitton handbags bearing spurious
Vuitton marks); Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., Inc. v. Wright, 811 F. Supp.
237 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (plaintiff’s battery labels attached to batteries that were
not genuine); Sports Design and Dev., Inc. v. Schoneboom, 871 F. Supp. 1158
(N.D. Iowa 1995) (look-a-like fishing lures sold in boxes bearing plaintiff’s
trademark); Reebok Int’l. Ltd. v. Marntech Enter., Inc., 737 F. Supp 1515
(discussing jurisdiction), and 737 F. Supp. 1521 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (look-a-like
Reebok shoes – complete with trademark stripes). “When an original mark is
attached to a product in such a way as to deceive the public, the product itself
becomes a ‘counterfeit’ just as it would if an imitation of the mark were
attached.” Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 106 F.3d at 900.
117. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Speicher, 676 F. Supp. 1421 (N.D.Ind. 1988),
reconsideration denied, 681 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ind. 1988), rev’d 877 F.2d 531
(7th Cir. 1989) (noting that a cutting insert is the cutting portion of a drill bit
or saw).
118. Speicher, 877 F.2d. at 533.
Evidence and testimony conflicted
regarding whether Speicher put to tools into the GE boxes, or if that was done
by the distributor. See id.
119. Speicher, 676 F. Supp. at 1428 (emphasis in original).
120. Speicher, 681 F. Supp. at 1338.
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The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Posner,
disagreed with the trial court’s interpretation of the term
“counterfeiting,” stating that the lower court’s literal
interpretation of counterfeiting
might be the correct one if section 1114(1)(a) was aimed just at
‘counterfeiting.’ But as the words ‘reproduction,’ ‘copy,’ and
‘colorable imitation’ suggest more clearly than ‘counterfeiting,’ the
aim is broader: to prohibit the use of your trademark on someone
else’s product without your authorization. The usual violator of
this prohibition copies, reproduces, imitates – or if you will
121
‘counterfeits’ – the trademark.

The court then held that Speicher’s use of the genuine GE
trademarks on the boxes constituted counterfeiting.
We can see no difference, so far as the objectives of section
1114(1)(a) are concerned, between doing this and making a
reproduction of GE’s trademark. The happenstance of having
trademarks made by the owner in one’s possession, so that one
doesn’t have to copy them, has no relevance to the purposes of the
statute. . . . The more fundamental point is that the purpose of
trademark law is not to guarantee genuine trademarks but to
guarantee that every item sold under a trademark is the genuine
122
trademarked product, not a substitute.

This statement could be interpreted to support either a
broad interpretation of counterfeiting (as Waco argued) or a
narrow interpretation of counterfeiting (as KHK argued). The
Seventh Circuit opinion can be broadly interpreted to stand for
the proposition that an item placed in a box bearing a spurious
trademark can be considered a counterfeit: “The more
fundamental point is that the purpose of trademark law is not to
guarantee genuine trademarks but to guarantee that every item
123
sold under a trademark is the genuine trademarked product.”
But it can also be fairly read to stand for the proposition that
this activity is merely trademark infringement under section
1114(1): “the aim [of section 1114(1)] is broader: to prohibit the
use of your trademark on someone else’s product without your
124
Because of this inconsistency, this decision
authorization.”
provides little assistance for our definitional inquiry.
121. Speicher, 877 F.2d at 534 (citing Louis Vuitton S.A. v. Pin Yang Lee,
875 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1989)).
122. Id. (citing Fendi S.A.S. de Paola Fendi e Sorelle v. Cosmetic World,
Ltd., 642 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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Second, Waco relied on Pepe (U.K.) Ltd. v. Ocean View
Factory Outlet Corp.125 in an attempt to stretch the
interpretation of counterfeiting somewhat, but again in a way
that helps neither a broad nor a narrow definition of
counterfeiting. Pepe involved a creative counterfeiter who
produced and sold T-shirts bearing variations of the registered
Pepe trademarks that were neither “identical with, or
126
the registered mark.
substantially indistinguishable from”
Pepe obtained an ex parte seizure under 15 U.S.C. §1116(d),
which the defendant claimed was wrongful because the marks
127
The district court determined that the
were not counterfeit.
knock-off shirts were indeed counterfeit, and quoted the
legislative history for the seizure statute to the effect that “a
mark need not be absolutely identical to a genuine mark in
order to be considered ‘counterfeit.’ Such an interpretation
would allow counterfeiters to escape liability by modifying the
registered trademarks of their honest competitors in trivial
128
The facts of the case support the contention that the
ways.”
spurious mark must be on the goods, but also supports the
extension of seizures to goods other than those bearing
“identical or . . . substantially indistinguishable” marks.
Third, Waco relied on Levi Strauss & Co. v. Shilon,129 which
proved equally unhelpful. This case involved the offering for
sale of “knock-off” Levi jeans with counterfeit Levi tags and
130
The defendant had offered counterfeit jeans and labels
labels.
to an investigator for Levi, but did not have the products in his
possession: he would deliver them from a factory in Mexico once
the sale was made. Levi was not able to obtain a seizure order
under the customs laws because it lacked actual counterfeits, so
it brought suit under the Lanham Act instead.131 The defendant
claimed he could not be liable for counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C.
§1114 because he did not have possession of the counterfeit
132
The court dismissed this argument, noting that the
goods.
infringement section applies equally to “offering for sale”
125. 770 F. Supp. 754 (D. Puerto Rico 1991).
126. See 15 U.S.C. §1127 (2001) (defining a “counterfeit” mark as “a
spurious mark which is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from,
a registered mark” (emphasis added)).
127. See Pepe, 770 F. Supp. at 756-57.
128. Id. at 758 (citing 130 Cong.Rec. H12078 (Daily Ed. Oct. 10, 1983).
129. 121 F.3d 1309 (9th Cir. 1997).
130. See id.
131. See 19 U.S.C. § 1526.
132. Levi Strauss & Co., 121 F.3d at 1311.
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infringing goods.
Neither the court nor the defendant
addressed the question of whether the separation of the goods
from the labels made the jeans counterfeit. However, the facts
of this case support the contention that a product can be
counterfeit where the spurious marks are provided separate
from the goods the court did not state this directly.
Clearly, neither statutory construction nor case law support
Waco’s definition of counterfeiting. It is reassuring to note that
common sense also cuts against Waco’s interpretation of
counterfeiting.
Under Waco’s definition of counterfeiting,
virtually all allegations of passing off would constitute
counterfeiting.
It should also be noted that trademark law in general
requires use of marks on goods, where the nature of the goods
allows. It is a fundamental feature of trademark law that
“trademark use” requires (if the nature of the goods allow)
affixation of the mark on the goods. “Because the value of a
trademark arises from its association with goods of a particular
quality and source, a trademark comes into existence only once
134
This comports with the
it is affixed to goods in commerce.”
statutory requirements for use of the mark on the goods as set
forth above. Because of this provision, courts have held that use
135
of the mark on invoices was insufficient to show use.
Based on this analysis, the goods sold by KHK were clearly
not counterfeit. The court was, therefore, correct in determining
that the seizure was wrongful. The court and jury also
determined that the seizure was sought, obtained, or conducted
in bad faith. Waco’s conduct in the case will be scrutinized to
determine what conduct constituted bad faith behavior.
B.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT

The Seizure Statute sets out three subsections that detail
the legal and factual information required in the application.
The statute specifically requires that the “application for an
order under this subsection shall be based on an affidavit or the
verified complaint establishing facts sufficient to support the
133. See id. at 1312.
134. Liebowitz v. Elsevier Sci. Ltd., 927 F. Supp. 688, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(citing United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1918)).
135. See S Indus., Inc. v. Stone Age Equip. Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d. 796 (N.D.
Ill. 1998); see also In re Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co., 455 F.2d 563 (C.C.P.A.
1972); In re Dura Corp., 188 U.S.P.Q. 701 (P.T.O. T.T.A.B. 1975).
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findings of fact and conclusions of law required for such order.”
Commentators have noted that in the ex parte seizure
application process, “complete candor with the court is Rule
137
In fact, the legislative history addresses this issue: in
One.”
an ex parte proceeding, the court will have no choice but to rely
138
on the representations of the applicant.
Additionally, one of the few reported seizure cases
specifically addressed this issue. In Super Power Supply, Inc. v.
Macase Indus. Corp. the plaintiff’s counsel told the court that
the defendant’s goods were counterfeit when in fact the
defendant was a disgruntled former distributor for the
plaintiff.139 The court stated that where “such extraordinary
relief as an unnoticed, ex parte seizure order is sought, the Court
necessarily relies upon the diligence, honesty, and
forthrightness of the represented party’s counsel to ensure that
the rights of the unrepresented party are not unduly
140
infringed.” The court granted sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11
against the plaintiff’s counsel because (1) he “should have
known after a reasonable investigation of the facts that he
had . . . no basis whatsoever upon which to seek unnoticed, ex
141
parte relief;” (2) he “intentionally misrepresented certain facts
142
to the Court;”
and (3) he “was dilatory in rectifying his
143
mistakes and omissions once they were made known to him.”
These holdings are particularly relevant here. Because the
court was relying on Waco’s factual and legal representations in
granting the seizure order, Waco owed the court (and ultimately
KHK) a duty to submit a seizure order that was consistent with
the statutory requirements, prior legal precedent, and the facts
Waco knew to be true. Despite this, Waco’s attorney candidly
admitted at trial that she saw herself not as an officer of the
court, but as an advocate for her client’s interests. At trial,
144
Waco’s attorney was questioned about her actions in obtaining
136. 15 U.S.C. §1116(d)(3) (2000).
137. TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING, supra note 7, at 16.
138. See Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130
CONG. REC. 31673 (1984), at 12080.
139. See Super Power Supply, Inc. v. Macase Indus. Corp., 154 F.R.D. 249, 249 (C.D.
Cal. 1994).
140. Id. at 256.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Though from the same law firm, the attorney that obtained the seizure
order did not participate in the trial in front of the jury. She did sit at the table
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the ex parte seizure application:
Q: Do you understand what the duty of candor is?
A: To be candid with the court when you make an application
to the Court. Is that what you are referring to?
Q: Yes.
correct?

Because you are an officer of the court.

Is that

A: Yes.
Q: Okay. And you’re also an advocate for your client. Is that
correct?
A: That’s right.
Q: And at some times – those two duties that you have
sometimes conflict. Isn’t that correct?
A: I suppose they might. . . .
Q: Do you think that that was an – you were being an
advocate for your client at that point or were you being more an
officet of the court when you explained what kind of seizure
application you were looking for?
A: I was an advocate for the client, sir.

145

Waco made a number of misrepresentations in its
application for seizure. First, Waco misrepresented the facts
regarding the marks on the scaffolding. Not only did Waco
obfuscate the fact that there were no “WACO” marks on the
KHK scaffolding, they ignored the fact that the KHK name was
on KHK’s scaffolding. Waco’s investigator, Robert Hardcastle,
in a declaration attached to Plaintiff’s Original Verified
Complaint stated that, based on his personal knowledge, the
scaffolding frames at the premises of KHK were not marked in
146
any way with their source or place of origin. Upon later crossexamination – at the preliminary injunction hearing – Mr.
Hardcastle admitted that he had not looked closely at the safety
sticker listing KHK’s name and phone number (which were
147
attached to the frames he purchased) prior to the seizure.
Waco also claimed that it had “exclusive rights to the color
148
red or the color blue on scaffolds and shores,” and stated that

and participated in drafting the jury charge and questions.
145. Waco Int’l, Inc. v. KHK Scaffolding, et al., C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Trial
Transcript, pp. 433 - 435 (June 19, 2000)).
146. See id. (Plaintiff’s Original Verified Complaint, Exhibit G (Docket
Entry No. 5)).
147. See id. (Transcript of June 8, 1998 Preliminary Injunction Hearing, pp.
101-102).
148. Id. (Plaintiff’s Original Verified Complaint, ¶ 13).
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149

it had used the color red exclusively for fifty years. Waco later
admitted that both statements were false. In response to a
Request for Admission, Waco admitted that, on April 30, 1998
(the date the Complaint and Application for Seizure were filed)
“it knew that Vanguard used a dark blue color for its scaffolding
products and that it did not advise the Court of that
150
The admission then attempts to distinguish the
knowledge.”
shades of the color blue as used by Waco and Vanguard, but the
Complaint and Application for Seizure did not specify shade and
151
requested the seizure of any blue scaffolding.
In a second Request for Admission, Waco admitted that its
Executive Vice President, Marty Coughlin, was aware,
“beginning about three or four years prior to the filing of this
suit, that A-1 Plank and Scaffolding Company would
manufacture a product and would paint it red pursuant to a
152
Waco again attempted to distinguish the
customer request.”
shade of the color red used by Waco and A-1, but the Complaint
and the Application for Seizure did not specify a shade of red.
153
and Vice
Additionally, Waco’s President, George Malley,
154
President, Marty Coughlin, both admitted in court that other
companies paint scaffolding red, and there is nothing that Waco
can do about it. Clearly Waco did not have the “exclusive use” of
the colors red or blue, and therefore, it misled the court in its
Verified Complaint.
Additionally, Waco misled the Court regarding the nature of
KHK’s business. One requirement for obtaining a seizure is to
show that the alleged “counterfeiter” would destroy the evidence
155
Courts, and the
of his misdeeds if given notice of a lawsuit.
149. See id. at paragraph 15.
150. Id. (Waco’s Response to KHK’s 1st Req. For Admission, Request No.
24).
151. Despite this admission, Waco did not drop its claims to blue until well
into the trial. At the first charge conference the Judge asked Waco about an
infringement question concerning red and blue scaffolding. He noted that
Waco had not presented any evidence concerning blue scaffolding, and asked if
they planned to do so. At that point Waco’s attorney dropped all claims
relating to blue.
152. Waco Int'l, Inc. v. KHK Scaffolding, et al., C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Waco’s
Response to KHK’s 1st Req. For Admission, Request No. 20).
153. Id. (Testimony of George Malley, Trial Transcript, pp. 730, (June 20,
2000)).
154. Id. (Testimony of Marty Coughlin, Trial Transcript, pp. 136 – 137,
(June 15, 2000)).
155. See 15 U.S.C. §1116(d)(4)(B) (2000). “The court shall not grant such an
application unless . . . the person against whom seizure would be ordered, or
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legislative history, state that this type of behavior generally
applies only to “fly-by-night” operators, and presumptively does
156
not apply to legitimate businesses.
In its seizure application,
Waco glossed over the fact that KHK had a permanent facility in
Houston with over three million dollars in inventory on the lot.
Given this investment, it would be highly unlikely that KHK
would destroy or abandon its facility simply to avoid a lawsuit.
Instead, Waco made the conclusory accusation that KHK would
destroy evidence.
Finally, Waco had the opportunity (and perhaps a duty) to
amend its complaint to conform to the facts, as they became
known. Waco’s failure to do so could also constitute bad faith,
and in fact both the legislative history and Super Case v. Macase
(discussed above), support this contention. The legislative
history states “should the plaintiff learn as a result of discovery
that any claim of counterfeiting is meritless, continued pursuit
157
of such a claim would be in bad faith.”
C.

SECURITY

Another important element in obtaining a seizure is that
the applicant posts bond “adequate . . . for the payment of such
damages as any person may be entitled to recover as a result of
158
a wrongful seizure.”
Congress described the security
159
requirement as “the heart of the ex parte seizure provisions,”
and noted that the “provision of a bond is one of the critical
procedural protections designed to ensure that the defendant’s
rights are adequately protected during the course of an ex parte
persons acting in concert with such person, would destroy, move, hide, or
otherwise make such matters inaccessible to the court, if the applicant were to
proceed on notice to such person.” Id.
156. See Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130
CONG. REC. 31673 (1984), at 12081. H12081, ¶ 7 states:
A reputable businessperson would not be likely to conceal or
destroy evidence when notified of a pending lawsuit, and the
issuance of an ex parte seizure order against such a person would
therefore be wholly inappropriate . . . . Rather, the sponsors
believe that ex parte seizures are a necessary tool to thwart the
bad faith efforts of fly by night defendants to evade the
jurisdiction of the court.
Id.
157. S. REP. NO. 98-526, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3627, at 19.
158. 15 U.S.C. §1116(d)(4)(A).
159. See 130 CONG. REC. 31673 (1984), at 12080. (“This subsection is the
heart of the ex parte seizure provisions.”)
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160

seizure.”
On May 5, 1998, after obtaining the seizure order and
immediately before proceeding with the seizure, Waco filed an
indemnity bond in the amount of $25,000. In determining the
amount of the bond, Waco’s attorney’s made no attempt to
determine the effect of a seizure on a scaffolding business like
KHK’s. At trial, Waco’s attorney candidly admitted that the
amount of the bond was based on a seizure of counterfeit Gucci
handbags that she had conducted fifteen years before.
Q: Okay. Well, how did you arrive at [$]25,000?
A: It was just the number I used in the past of other seizures
– that I think we used in the Gucci case.
Q: So, it had no relationship to the actual value of the goods
that you were going to go out and seize. Is that correct?
A: That’s correct.

161

The bond, therefore, was grossly inadequate to compensate
KHK in the event that the seizure went wrong. The bond was
also titled an “Injunction Bond” and was specifically for damages
that KHK Scaffolding Houston, Inc. “may sustain by reason of
the Injunction order in this action, if it be finally decided that
the said Preliminary Injunction order in this action ought not
have been granted.” There was no reference whatsoever in the
bond to the Seizure Order or to coverage for Waco’s liability for
damages for the specifically enumerated cause of action for
“wrongful seizure” set out in 15 U.S.C. §1116(d)(11). The bond
was, therefore, most likely defective on its face. Taken together,
these two facts indicate that Waco was not concerned about the
bond – it was merely a step to be taken – and not the vital
protection that Congress presumed.
D. GOODS TO BE SEIZED AND THE LOCATION
The seizure statute requires that the seizure order set forth
162
“a particular description of the matter to be seized.”
This
section, as mentioned previously, is designed to prevent broadbased searches that would violate a defendants Fourth
Amendment rights. As the Supreme Court stated regarding the
specificity requirement: “the requirement ensures that the
160. Id.
161. Waco Int’l, Inc. v. KHK Scaffolding, et al., C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Trial
Testimony, p. 441).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(5)(b).
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search will be carefully tailored to its justification, and will not
take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches
163
the Framers intended to prohibit.”
Despite this requirement
of specificity, the seizure order in this case allowed for the
seizure of “all scaffolding and shoring frames and parts bearing
the paint color red and the paint color blue” located at KHK’s
164
Houston facility. Pursuant to this order, Waco’s attorneys and
two United States Marshals entered KHK’s facility and
impounded all red and blue scaffolding, and most of KHK’s
165
business records.
Evidence at trial indicated that a total of 7525 pieces of
frame scaffolding were seized by placing yellow police tape on
and around stacks of frames in KHK’s yard. The seized
scaffolding included 600 red 5’x6’7” walk through frames (which
KHK referred to as “Waco Style” frames), 3400 red shoring
frames, 1925 blue 5’x6’4” walk through frames (which KHK
166
referred to as “Safway Style” frames ), and 1600 blue “Safway
167
Style” mason frames.
Both red and blue goods were seized despite the fact that
Waco knew that KHK did not stock any blue Waco compatible
scaffolding frames. When Waco’s investigator went to KHK to
purchase scaffolding that Waco feared KHK was selling as
“Waco” scaffolding, the salesman told him that there was no WB
(or “Waco Blue” style) scaffolding in stock. Despite its failure to
obtain or verify that KHK was selling, or even possessed, “Waco
Blue” scaffolding, Waco obtained a seizure for, and actually
seized, 3525 blue “Safway style” scaffolding frames.
At trial, Waco’s attorney seemed unconcerned by this:
Q: And when he [Waco’s investigator] asked for WB frames,
he was told that there weren’t any WB frames. Correct?
A: That’s right.
Q: So, when you went in for the seizure application, you had

163. Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. Jane Does # 1-2 and John Does # 1-10, 876
F. Supp. 407, 413 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79,
84 (1987).
164. Waco Int’l, Inc., C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Order of Seizure of Goods Being
Offered and Sold Under Counterfeit Registered Trademark Pursuant to 15
U.S.C. §1116(d)(1)(A), paragraph 2).
165. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Speicher, 877 F.2d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 1989)
(indicating cases allow the seizure of business records).
166. Safway sells its frames in gray, not blue. See Waco International, Inc.,
C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Plaintiff Trial Exhibit 131, “Safway Catalogue”).
167. Waco Int’l, Inc., C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Plaintiff Trial Exhibit 74,
“Inventory”).
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no earthly idea what WB frames looked like, did you?
A: You’re correct.
Q: But, still, you went forward with the idea that blue frames
were to be seized because they were counterfeit of Waco’s frames.
Is that correct?
A: The blue frames were seized because they [KHK] were
offering Waco Blue.
Q: But you never purchased any.
A: That’s correct.

168

The legislative history notes that “the mere fact that a few
legitimate items may have been seized does not make the
seizure as a whole wrongful; otherwise, a counterfeiter could
ensure that any seizure of its counterfeit merchandise would be
“wrongful” simply by mingling a few genuine items with [the]
169
Here (even assuming Waco’s
inventory of fakes.”
interpretation of counterfeiting and broadly granting it rights to
all red scaffolding) almost half the goods seized were legitimate.
This far exceeds the “mingling of a few genuine items”
mentioned in the legislative history.
It should also be noted that Waco had the opportunity to
inspect the blue scaffolding to determine if it was “Waco Blue”
style scaffolding, and did not. In fact, Waco never proved that
KHK ever sold “Waco Blue” style scaffolding. Waco was unable
to prove this because KHK never did sell that particular style of
scaffolding. Despite the complete lack of evidence to support
this claim, Waco pursued claims based on the color blue until
the charge conference at trial.
It is not possible to determine directly from the jury’s
verdict what specific factor or factors they considered in finding
that the seizure was in bad faith. It may have been that fact
that Waco’s legal claims of counterfeiting were entirely baseless.
It may have been the fact that Waco made numerous
misrepresentations in its application for the seizure order, or
posted a bond grossly inadequate to compensate KHK and,
amusingly enough, based on the value of counterfeit handbags.
It may have been that Waco obtained a broad-based seizure that
effectively allowed it to shut down a competitor. Most likely the
jury determined that, taken together, all of these evidenced a
complete disregard for KHK’s rights and the legal requirements
168. Waco Int’l, Inc. v. KHK Scaffolding, et al., C.A. No. H-98-1309, (Trial
Testimony).
169. 15 U.S.C §1127.
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for obtaining a seizure.
V.

CONCLUSION

The seizure of goods is an important tool in fighting
trademark counterfeiting. Unfortunately, if mishandled, a
seizure can turn around to hurt the owner of the trademark, as
illustrated by Waco International v. KHK Scaffolding, et al. An
attorney considering an application for a seizure should take
heed of Waco’s errors and remember that the purpose of the
seizure statute checklist is not only to protect a defendant, but
also to protect the applicant from paying for a wrongful seizure.

